Supreme Court Upholds Trial Despite 37-Year Delay in L.N. Mishra Assassination Case: Ranjan Dwivedi vs. CBI (2012) INSC 487 (17 August 2012)

Introduction

Date of the Judgment: 17 August 2012

Citation: (2012) INSC 487

Judges: H.L. Dattu, J. and Chandramouli Kr. Prasad, J.

Can a criminal trial be quashed solely based on the length of delay, even if the delay is substantial? The Supreme Court of India addressed this critical question in the case of Ranjan Dwivedi vs. C.B.I., concerning the assassination of the then Union Railway Minister, Shri. L.N. Mishra. The core issue was whether the 37-year delay in the trial violated the accused’s fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court, while acknowledging the extraordinary delay, ultimately refused to quash the trial, directing the trial court to expedite the proceedings. The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench consisting of Justice H.L. Dattu and Justice Chandramouli Kr. Prasad, with both judges concurring in the final decision.

Case Background

The case revolves around the assassination of Shri. L.N. Mishra, the Union Railway Minister, who was injured in a bomb blast at Samastipur Railway Station on January 2, 1975, and succumbed to his injuries the following day. The initial investigation was conducted by the Bihar C.I.D. before being transferred to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The CBI filed a charge sheet on November 10, 1975. Due to interference from the then Bihar Government, the case was transferred to Delhi by the Supreme Court on December 17, 1979. The trial commenced in Delhi, but despite a 1991 Supreme Court order to expedite the trial, it remained pending for 37 years. The accused, including Ranjan Dwivedi and Ac. Sudevananda Avadhuta, filed writ petitions seeking to quash the charges and trial due to the excessive delay.

Timeline

Course of Proceedings

The trial was initiated by the Additional Sessions Judge, Karkardooma, Delhi, after charges were framed against the accused. Despite a previous direction from the Supreme Court in 1991 to expedite the trial, the proceedings continued for another two decades. Statements of the accused under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code were recorded, court witnesses were examined, and the statements of defense witnesses were also completed. The case was at the stage of arguments when the present writ petitions were filed.

Legal Framework

The primary legal framework in this case is Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. The Supreme Court has interpreted this to include the right to a speedy trial. The Court also considered Section 309 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which aims to ensure that proceedings are conducted expeditiously.

Arguments

Petitioner’s Arguments:

• The trial has been ongoing for more than 37 years, violating the fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution.
• The petitioners have spent a significant portion of their lives in jail during the trial, and their fate remains uncertain.
• The Supreme Court’s 1991 direction to expedite the trial was ignored by the trial court.
• The systemic failure of the judicial system has severely prejudiced the petitioners.
• The delay itself is a form of punishment and the trial should be quashed.

Respondent’s Arguments:

• The Supreme Court had previously rejected a plea for quashing the trial in 1991.
• The prosecution is not responsible for the delay from 1991 onwards.
• The prosecution sought adjournments only on a few occasions with valid reasons.
• Criminal courts are not obligated to terminate trials merely due to the lapse of time.
• The purpose of criminal proceedings is to find the truth, which can only be done after the conclusion of the trial.
• The delay was due to the dilatory tactics adopted by the accused.

The petitioners argued that the extraordinary delay of 37 years was a clear violation of their right to a speedy trial, emphasizing that the delay itself constitutes a form of punishment. They contended that the systemic failure of the judicial system had severely prejudiced them and their families. The respondent, on the other hand, argued that the prosecution was not responsible for the delay and that the trial should continue to determine the truth. They also pointed out that the Supreme Court had previously rejected a similar plea in 1991.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The primary issue before the Supreme Court was:

1. Whether the 37-year delay in the trial violated the petitioners’ fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, warranting the quashing of charges and trial.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

Authorities

The Supreme Court relied on several key cases to address the issue of the right to a speedy trial:

• Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225: This case laid down guidelines for determining whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated. It emphasized the need to consider all attendant circumstances, including the nature of the offense, the number of accused and witnesses, and the workload of the court. The Court observed that the right to speedy trial is a right of the accused and that the concern underlying the right to speedy trial from the point of view of the accused are: (a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be as short as possible; (b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his vocation and peace should be minimal; and (c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of the accused to defend himself.
• Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569: This case further emphasized that the right to a speedy trial is an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty under Article 21. The Court observed that the right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent incarceration and continues at all stages. The Court also observed that the fact of delay is dependent on the circumstances of each case because reasons for delay will vary.
• P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578: This seven-judge bench overruled previous decisions that prescribed specific time limits for the conclusion of criminal trials. The Court held that criminal courts are not obliged to terminate trials merely due to the lapse of time. The Court observed that the dictum in A.R. Antulay case is correct and still holds the field and the guidelines laid down in A.R. Antulay case are not exhaustive but only illustrative.
• State v. Narayan Waman Nerukar (Dr), (2002) 7 SCC 6: The Supreme Court held that criminal courts are not obliged to terminate trial of criminal proceedings merely on account of lapse of time. The Court observed that each case has to be judged in its own background and special features.
• Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar (2009) 3 SCC 355: This case highlighted that the right to a speedy trial applies not only to court proceedings but also to police investigations. The Court observed that in every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the court has to perform the balancing act by taking into consideration all the attendant circumstances and determine in each case as to whether the right to speedy trial has been actually denied in a given case.
• Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty, (2007) 7 SCC 394: The Court noted that a crime never dies and the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to criminal proceedings unless there are express and specific provisions to that effect. The Court observed that a criminal offence is considered as a wrong against the State and the society even though it has been committed against an individual and a court of law has no power to throw away prosecution solely on the ground of delay.
• P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398: The Court observed that whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal is immaterial and the question whether the materials at the hands of the prosecution are sufficient or not are matters for trial.

Judgment

How each authority was viewed by the Court:

• The Court followed the guidelines laid down in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225* for determining whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated.
• The Court reiterated the importance of the right to a speedy trial as part of Article 21, as established in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569*.
• The Court relied on P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578* to support its decision that trials should not be terminated solely due to delay.
• The Court relied on State v. Narayan Waman Nerukar (Dr), (2002) 7 SCC 6* to support its decision that criminal courts are not obliged to terminate trial of criminal proceedings merely on account of lapse of time.
• The Court relied on Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar (2009) 3 SCC 355* to support its decision that speedy trial applies to police investigations as well.
• The Court relied on Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty, (2007) 7 SCC 394* to support its decision that a crime never dies and the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to criminal proceedings.
• The Court relied on P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398* to support its decision that whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal is immaterial and the question whether the materials at the hands of the prosecution are sufficient or not are matters for trial.

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was influenced by several factors. The Court emphasized that the right to a speedy trial is not absolute and must be balanced with other considerations, such as the need to ensure a fair trial and to determine the truth. The Court also noted that the delay in this case was not solely attributable to the prosecution but also to the dilatory tactics adopted by the accused. The Court was also influenced by the fact that the trial was at the stage of arguments and that quashing the trial at this stage would not be in the interest of justice. The Court also acknowledged the hard work of the judicial officers who have painstakingly suffered with all the dilatory tactics adopted by the accused in dragging on with the proceedings for nearly thirty seven years.

The Court’s reasoning was primarily based on the legal principles established in previous cases and the specific facts of the case. The Court held that while a speedy trial is a fundamental right, it is not an absolute right and must be balanced against other considerations. The Court also emphasized that each case must be judged on its own merits.

The Court considered alternative arguments, such as quashing the trial due to the excessive delay, but ultimately rejected them, citing the need to determine the truth and the fact that the delay was not solely attributable to the prosecution. The Court also noted that the trial was at the stage of arguments, and quashing it at this stage would not be in the interest of justice. The final decision was to dismiss the writ petitions and direct the trial court to expedite the proceedings.

The Supreme Court’s decision was that the trial should not be quashed, but the trial court was directed to expedite the proceedings. The Court emphasized that the right to a speedy trial is not absolute and must be balanced with other considerations.

The Court stated that, “The guarantee of a speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression and prevent delay by imposing on the court and the prosecution an obligation to proceed with the trial with a reasonable dispatch.” The Court also noted that, “The reasons for the delay is one of the factors which courts would normally assess in determining as to whether a particular accused has been deprived of his or her right to speedy trial, including the party to whom the delay is attributable.” Furthermore, the Court observed, “Presumptive prejudice is not an alone dispositive of speedy trial claim and must be balanced against other factors.”

Both Justice H.L. Dattu and Justice Chandramouli Kr. Prasad concurred in the final decision. Justice Chandramouli Kr. Prasad added a few words of his own, emphasizing that judicial discipline expects the court to follow the ratio laid down by the earlier decisions of the Constitution Benches of the Supreme Court.

Key Takeaways

✓ The right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution is not absolute and must be balanced with other factors.

✓ Criminal trials should not be quashed solely based on the length of delay, especially when the delay is partly attributable to the accused.

✓ The courts must consider all attendant circumstances, including the nature of the offense, the number of accused and witnesses, and the workload of the court.

✓ The primary purpose of criminal proceedings is to determine the truth.

✓ Trial courts should expedite proceedings without granting unnecessary adjournments.

This judgment reinforces the principle that while the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right, it is not absolute and must be balanced with the need to ensure a fair trial and to determine the truth. The judgment also highlights the importance of judicial discipline and the need to follow the ratio laid down by the Constitution Benches of the Supreme Court. It emphasizes that the courts must consider all attendant circumstances, including the conduct of the accused, while deciding on the issue of delay.

Directions

The Supreme Court directed the learned trial judge to take up the case on a day-to-day basis and conclude the proceedings as early as possible, without granting unnecessary and unwarranted adjournments.

Development of Law

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the right to a speedy trial is not an absolute right and must be balanced with other considerations, such as the need to ensure a fair trial and to determine the truth. The Court also held that criminal trials should not be quashed solely based on the length of delay, especially when the delay is partly attributable to the accused. This case reaffirms the principles laid down in previous cases, such as Abdul Rehman Antulay and P. Ramachandra Rao, and does not change the previous positions of law.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ petitions seeking to quash the trial in the L.N. Mishra assassination case, despite a 37-year delay. The Court held that the delay was not solely attributable to the prosecution and directed the trial court to expedite the proceedings. This judgment reinforces the principle that the right to a speedy trial is not absolute and must be balanced with other considerations.