Supreme Court Upholds Withdrawal of Land Acquisition: U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad vs. Ram Singh (2022)

Date of the Judgment: April 20, 2022
Citation: 2022 INSC 408
Judges: K.M. Joseph, J. and Hrishikesh Roy, J.
Can a government authority withdraw from acquiring land after initiating the acquisition process? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this question in a case involving the U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad and a landowner, Ram Singh. The court examined the legality of the government’s decision to withdraw from acquiring land, particularly when possession was disputed. This judgment clarifies the conditions under which such withdrawals are permissible and emphasizes the importance of following due process.

Case Background

The case began with a notification issued on November 10, 1973, by the U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad (the appellant) under Section 28 of the U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965, which is equivalent to a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. This notification proposed to acquire land, including Khasra Plot No. 7 and Khasra Plot No. 3, totaling 5.98 acres, originally owned by Shri Ram Ratan. Ram Ratan’s son, Ram Singh, and later his legal representatives, became the respondents in this case. A subsequent notification under Section 32 of the Adhiniyam, equivalent to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, was issued on August 17, 1977. The urgency clause under Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was invoked on July 18, 1979. The appellant claimed possession of the land was taken on December 11, 1981, and March 31, 1983. The appellant also stated that a notice under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on September 25, 1985, and an award was passed on September 28, 1985.

Ram Singh submitted an application on November 19, 1985, claiming compensation, asserting he was the sole owner and had not sold the land. However, a notification dated July 7, 2005, was issued, exempting Khasra Nos. 3 and 7 from acquisition. The appellant contested this, arguing that the land had been acquired, an award had been passed, and possession had been taken. This led to the government issuing another notification on April 25, 2008, canceling the July 7, 2005, notification and directing the matter to be reconsidered. Ram Singh challenged this cancellation in a writ petition, which was initially allowed by the High Court on August 31, 2010. This decision was challenged in the Supreme Court, which allowed the appellant to seek a recall of the High Court order. The High Court rejected the recall application on December 20, 2016, leading to the current appeals.

Timeline:

Course of Proceedings

The High Court initially allowed the writ petition filed by Ram Singh, setting aside the government’s notification dated April 25, 2008, which had canceled the earlier exemption of the land from acquisition. The High Court’s decision was based on the grounds that no notice under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued and that possession of the land had not been taken. The appellant then approached the Supreme Court, which allowed the appellant to seek a recall of the High Court’s order. However, the High Court rejected the recall application, leading to the present appeals before the Supreme Court.

Legal Framework

The core legal issue revolves around Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which states:
“48. Completion of acquisition not compulsory, but compensation to be awarded when not completed. –(1) Except in the case provided for in section 36, the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken.”
This section allows the government to withdraw from acquiring land if possession has not been taken. However, the Supreme Court has clarified that this power is not absolute and must be exercised fairly and without arbitrariness. The court also considered the implications of Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, which allows for the taking of possession in cases of urgency after 15 days of the publication of notice under Section 9(1). The Court also considered the Government Order No. 592/1-13-2002-Ra-13 dated 19 June, 2002 and Government Order No. 1291/1-13-2006-20(46)/2002-Ra-13 dated 15 September, 2006.

Arguments

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The appellant argued that the government’s order dated April 25, 2008, was merely a withdrawal of an earlier order and a referral of the matter to the competent authority for a decision on whether to withdraw from the acquisition.
• They contended that the land was acquired following due process under the Adhiniyam and the Land Acquisition Act, including notifications under Sections 28 and 32 of the Adhiniyam (equivalent to Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act), a notice under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act, and an award.
• The appellant emphasized that the original owner, Ram Singh, had acknowledged the award and sought compensation on November 19, 1985, which was deposited.
• They argued that the respondents could not claim possession was not taken, as they had accepted the award, and that the withdrawal from acquisition was not in accordance with statutory provisions, especially since the land was crucial for a housing scheme.
• The appellant also contended that the land was central to a housing scheme for the Low-Income Group, and withdrawing from the acquisition was against public interest.
• The appellant also relied on a notice dated 25.09.1985 and the fact that the award was passed, which meant that possession was taken.

Respondent’s Arguments:

• The respondents argued that possession under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act must be actual, not symbolic. They contended that no actual possession was taken, and therefore, the government’s withdrawal was valid.
• They pointed out that the compensation was deposited only in 2004, and this did not validate the acquisition.
• The respondents highlighted that the government’s order dated April 25, 2008, was based on an order passed after the notification dated July 7, 2005. The notification dated July 7, 2005, was based on the government order dated June 19, 2002, which ceded power to the Revenue Department, while the order dated April 25, 2008, was based on the order dated September 15, 2006, which had prospective operation.
• They argued that the order dated September 15, 2006, was prospective and did not affect prior orders, making the order dated April 25, 2008, legally unsustainable.
• The respondents also noted that the appellant was given an opportunity to be heard before the notification dated July 7, 2005, was passed.
• They emphasized that a government order must be judged on its express terms and cannot be validated by affidavits or submissions in court, citing the judgment in Mohinder Singh Gill vs. CEC [1978 (1) SCC 405].
• The respondents also argued that the appellant did not challenge the notification dated July 7, 2005.

Submissions Table

Innovativeness of the argument: The respondent’s argument that the government order dated April 25, 2008, was based on an order (dated September 15, 2006) that had prospective effect was innovative because it directly challenged the legal basis of the government’s action. This argument was crucial in highlighting the procedural flaw in the government’s decision.

Issues Framed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court did not explicitly frame issues in a separate section. However, the core issues addressed by the court were:

1. Whether the government could withdraw from the acquisition of land under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, if actual possession had not been taken.
2. Whether the notification dated April 25, 2008, canceling the earlier exemption of the land from acquisition was legally valid.
3. Whether the government had followed due process in the acquisition and withdrawal process.
4. Whether the communication dated 25.09.1985 can be considered as notice under Section 9(3) of the Land Acquisition Act.

Treatment of the Issue by the Court

The following table demonstrates as to how the Court decided the issues

Authorities

The Supreme Court considered the following authorities:

Cases:

• Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat and Others [1998 (4) SCC 387]: This case established that a notification must be issued if the government decides to withdraw from acquisition under Section 48 and that the beneficiary must be given an opportunity to be heard.
• 1998 (1) SCC 591: This case clarified that the power to withdraw from acquisition under Section 48 is not arbitrary and must be exercised fairly and in good faith.
• 2001 (1) SCC 610: This case reiterated that an opportunity of being heard must be given to the beneficiary before power is invoked under Section 48.
• Mohinder Singh Gill vs CEC [1978 (1) SCC 405]: This case established that a government order must be judged on its express terms and cannot be validated by affidavits or submissions in court.

Legal Provisions:

• Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894: This section allows the government to withdraw from acquisition if possession has not been taken.
• Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894: This section allows the government to take possession of land in cases of urgency after 15 days of the publication of notice under Section 9(1).
• Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894: This section deals with the issuance of notices to persons interested in the land being acquired.
• Section 28 of the U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965: This section is equivalent to Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
• Section 32 of the U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965: This section is equivalent to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

Authority Consideration Table

Judgment

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the High Court’s decision. The Court found that the government’s order dated April 25, 2008, was invalid because it was based on a government order that had prospective operation and could not affect the earlier notification dated July 7, 2005. The Court also emphasized that the withdrawal from acquisition under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act is permissible only if actual possession of the land has not been taken. The Court clarified that “possession” in this context means actual physical possession, not merely symbolic or paper possession. The Court noted that the notification dated July 7, 2005, was issued after the appellant was given an opportunity to be heard. The Court also found that no notice under Section 9(3) was issued to the land owner, and the communication dated 25.09.1985 was not a notice under Section 9(3) of the Land Acquisition Act.

Treatment of Submissions and Authorities

What weighed in the mind of the Court?

The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the following factors:

• Actual Possession: The Court emphasized that the term “possession” under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act means actual, physical possession, not merely symbolic or paper possession. This was a crucial factor in determining whether the government could withdraw from the acquisition.
• Prospective Application of Law: The Court was influenced by the fact that the government order dated April 25, 2008, was based on the order dated September 15, 2006, which had prospective effect and therefore could not affect the notification dated July 7, 2005.
• Due Process: The Court considered that the notification dated July 7, 2005, was issued after the appellant was given an opportunity to be heard, highlighting the importance of following due process in acquisition and withdrawal proceedings.
• Absence of Notice under Section 9(3): The Court noted the absence of notice under Section 9(3) of the Land Acquisition Act, which would have proved that possession was taken.
• Interpretation of Section 48: The Court interpreted Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act to mean that withdrawal is permissible only if actual possession has not been taken, thus limiting the government’s power to withdraw from acquisition.

Sentiment Analysis Table

Fact:Law Ratio Table

Logical Reasoning

The Court considered alternative interpretations but rejected them, emphasizing that the plain meaning of “possession” in Section 48 requires actual physical control of the land. The Court’s reasoning was based on a strict interpretation of the law and the facts of the case.

The court held that the government’s order dated April 25, 2008, wasinvalid because it was based on a government order that had prospective operation and could not affect the earlier notification dated July 7, 2005. The Court also emphasized that the withdrawal from acquisition under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act is permissible only if actual possession of the land has not been taken. The Court clarified that “possession” in this context means actual physical possession, not merely symbolic or paper possession. The Court noted that the notification dated July 7, 2005, was issued after the appellant was given an opportunity to be heard. The Court also found that no notice under Section 9(3) was issued to the land owner, and the communication dated 25.09.1985 was not a notice under Section 9(3) of the Land Acquisition Act.

Ratio Decidendi

The ratio decidendi of this judgment is that the government can withdraw from the acquisition of land under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, only if actual physical possession of the land has not been taken. The term “possession” in this context means actual physical control of the land, not merely symbolic or paper possession. Additionally, a government order cannot have retrospective effect unless it is expressly stated to have retrospective operation. The court also held that a notification under Section 48 must be based on valid legal grounds and after giving an opportunity to the beneficiary to be heard.

Obiter Dicta

While the main focus of the judgment was on the interpretation of Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act and the validity of the government’s notification, the court made several obiter dicta:

• The court emphasized the importance of following due process in land acquisition and withdrawal proceedings.
• The court reiterated the principle that government orders must be judged on their express terms and cannot be validated by affidavits or submissions in court.
• The court clarified that the communication dated 25.09.1985 was not a notice under Section 9(3) of the Land Acquisition Act.
• The court noted that the notification dated July 7, 2005, was issued after the appellant was given an opportunity to be heard.

Impact of the Judgment

This judgment has several significant implications:

• Clarity on Possession: It clarifies that “possession” under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act means actual, physical possession, not merely symbolic or paper possession. This provides a clear guideline for government authorities when considering withdrawal from land acquisition.
• Limitations on Government Power: It limits the government’s power to withdraw from land acquisition, emphasizing that such withdrawal is permissible only if actual possession has not been taken. This ensures that the government cannot arbitrarily withdraw from acquisition after taking possession.
• Emphasis on Due Process: It reinforces the importance of following due process in land acquisition and withdrawal proceedings, ensuring that all parties are given a fair opportunity to be heard.
• Retrospective Application of Law: It highlights that government orders cannot have retrospective effect unless expressly stated, safeguarding against arbitrary changes in legal positions.
• Protection of Landowners’ Rights: The judgment protects the rights of landowners by ensuring that their land cannot be acquired and then withdrawn arbitrarily, emphasizing that the government must follow the law and due process.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment in U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad vs. Ram Singh (2022) is a significant ruling that clarifies the scope of Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The court’s emphasis on the requirement of actual physical possession for the government to withdraw from land acquisition provides a crucial safeguard against arbitrary actions by the government. The judgment also reinforces the importance of following due process in land acquisition and withdrawal proceedings and highlights the limitations on the retrospective application of government orders. This case serves as a reminder of the importance of protecting landowners’ rights and ensuring that government authorities adhere to the law when dealing with land acquisition matters.