Date of the Judgment: June 16, 2022
Citation: (2022) INSC 549
Judges: Dinesh Maheshwari, J., Vikram Nath, J.
Can offenses occurring in different locations be tried together? The Supreme Court of India recently addressed this complex question in a case involving allegations of rape, abuse, and threats. The Court had to determine whether these acts were part of the same transaction for the purpose of trial. This judgment clarifies the application of Section 220 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, regarding the joinder of charges. The bench comprised Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and Vikram Nath, with Justice Maheshwari authoring the judgment.
Case Background
The case revolves around Ms. P and Mr. Narendra Sah, who were engaged on November 13, 2015, in Village Dangidhar, Uttarakhand. Ms. P alleged that in February 2016, Mr. Sah invited her to Delhi, where he sexually assaulted her against her will. She further claimed that he demanded money and later refused to marry her. Following this, he allegedly hurled abuses and issued death threats to her. Ms. P’s mother filed a complaint which led to the registration of an FIR.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| November 13, 2015 | Engagement of Ms. P and Mr. Narendra Sah at Village Dangidhar, Uttarakhand. |
| February 2016 | Alleged sexual assault of Ms. P by Mr. Sah in Delhi. |
| March 23, 2016 | Ms. P visited Delhi again and had physical relations with Mr. Sah with consent on the pretext of marriage. |
| November 1, 2016 | Mr. Sah filed an affidavit assuring marriage to Ms. P in December 2016. |
| December 12, 2016 | Ms. P’s mother filed a complaint at P.S. Gairsain, District Chamoli. |
| December 16, 2016 | Ms. P’s mother filed a complaint to the superintendent of police, Distt. Chamoli. |
| January 21, 2017 | Judicial Magistrate directed the police to register an FIR. |
| October 28, 2017 | Sessions Judge, Chamoli, discharged Mr. Sah of the offense under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 due to lack of territorial jurisdiction. |
| September 25, 2018 | High Court of Uttarakhand dismissed the revision petition against the Sessions Judge’s order. |
| May 1, 2019 | Judicial Magistrate acquitted Mr. Sah of the offenses under Sections 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. |
| June 16, 2022 | Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the discharge of Mr. Sah under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. |
Course of Proceedings
The Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Gairsain, ordered the registration of an FIR. Following the investigation, a charge sheet was filed for offenses under Sections 376 (rape), 504 (intentional insult), and 506 (criminal intimidation) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The case was committed to the Sessions Court in Chamoli. The Sessions Judge discharged Mr. Sah of the rape charge under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, citing a lack of territorial jurisdiction, as the alleged rape occurred in Delhi. The case for the remaining offenses (Sections 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860) was transferred to the Judicial Magistrate. The High Court dismissed the revision petition, treating the discharge as an acquittal.
Legal Framework
The Supreme Court considered several sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, including:
- Section 177: “Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.” This section establishes the general rule for territorial jurisdiction.
- Section 178: This section deals with situations where the place of offense is uncertain, or the offense is a continuing one, or consists of several acts done in different areas. It states that such offenses may be inquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.
- Section 179: “When an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued.” This section allows trial in the place where the act was done or where the consequence occurred.
- Section 180: This section allows trial in the place where an act is an offense by reason of its relation to another offense.
- Section 184: This section pertains to the place of trial for offenses triable together.
- Section 218: “(1) For every distinct offence of which any person is accused there shall be a separate charge and every such charge shall be tried separately” This section mandates separate charges for distinct offenses.
- Section 220: “(1) If, in one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction, more offences than one are committed by the same person, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, every such offence.” This section allows for a joint trial of multiple offenses committed in the same transaction.
- Section 461: This section lists irregularities that vitiate proceedings.
The Court also referred to Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which defines the offense of rape, and Sections 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which deal with intentional insult and criminal intimidation, respectively.
Arguments
Appellant’s Arguments:
- The offenses under Sections 376, 504, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, were part of the same transaction and should have been tried together.
- The Sessions Judge erred in segregating the charges based on territorial jurisdiction.
- The appellant consistently maintained that she was subjected to sexual intercourse under the threat of ending the matrimonial alliance.
- The consent given under fear or misconception is not valid under Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
- The trial for offenses under Sections 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, before the Judicial Magistrate should be quashed.
State’s Arguments:
- Supported the appellant’s arguments, stating that the offenses formed part of the same transaction.
- The Sessions Judge was competent to try all the offenses together.
- The trial conducted by the Judicial Magistrate was vitiated under Section 461(l) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
- The evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient to hold the accused guilty in a rape case.
Accused’s Arguments:
- The Sessions Judge rightly separated the charges as the offense under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, occurred in Delhi, outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Chamoli court.
- The offenses were not part of the same transaction.
- The accused was acquitted of the charges under Sections 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
- The FIR was based on a concocted story to harass the accused.
| Main Submission | Sub-Submissions by Appellant | Sub-Submissions by State | Sub-Submissions by Accused |
|---|---|---|---|
| Offenses part of the same transaction | ✓ Offenses under Sections 376, 504, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 should be tried together. ✓ Sessions Judge erred in segregating charges. |
✓ Supported the appellant’s argument that offenses formed part of the same transaction. ✓ Sessions Judge was competent to try all offenses together. |
✓ Offenses were not part of the same transaction. ✓ Sessions Judge rightly separated the charges. |
| Territorial Jurisdiction | ✓ Sessions Judge lacked jurisdiction to discharge the accused under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. | ✓ Sessions Judge was competent to try all offenses together. | ✓ Offense under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, occurred in Delhi, outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Chamoli court. |
| Validity of Trial | ✓ Trial for offenses under Sections 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, before the Judicial Magistrate should be quashed. | ✓ Trial conducted by the Judicial Magistrate was vitiated under Section 461(l) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. | ✓ Accused was acquitted of the charges under Sections 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. |
| Merits of the Case | ✓ Appellant consistently maintained that she was subjected to sexual intercourse under threat. ✓ Consent was not valid under Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. |
✓ Evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient to hold the accused guilty in a rape case. | ✓ FIR was based on a concocted story to harass the accused. |
Issues Framed by the Supreme Court
The main issue before the Supreme Court was:
✓ Whether the allegations against the accused-respondent No. 2, of committing rape, hurling abuses and extending threats, respectively pertaining to offences under Sections 376, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, could be said to be ‘one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction’ for the purpose of trial together in terms of Section 220 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973?
Treatment of the Issue by the Court
| Issue | Court’s Decision | Brief Reasons |
|---|---|---|
| Whether the offenses were part of the same transaction under Section 220 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 | No | The acts of sexual assault in Delhi and the subsequent threats in Uttarakhand were not proximate in time or place, lacked continuity, and did not share a common purpose or design. |
Authorities
The Court considered the following authorities:
| Authority | Court | Legal Point | How the Authority was used |
|---|---|---|---|
| Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and Anr. : (1999) 8 SCC 728 | Supreme Court of India | Territorial jurisdiction and investigation | Referred to, but distinguished as it dealt with the issue of jurisdiction at the investigation stage and continuing offenses. |
| Sunita Kumari Kashyap v. State of Bihar and Anr. : (2011) 11 SCC 301 | Supreme Court of India | Continuing offense and territorial jurisdiction | Referred to, but distinguished as it dealt with continuing offenses of cruelty and dowry demand. |
| Mohan Baitha and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr.: (2001) 4 SCC 350 | Supreme Court of India | Definition of “same transaction” under Section 220 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 | Relied upon for the principles on determining what constitutes the “same transaction”. |
| Anju Chaudhary v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. : (2013) 6 SCC 384 | Supreme Court of India | Tests for determining “same transaction” | Relied upon for the tests to determine if two or more acts constitute the same transaction. |
| Section 177, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 | – | Ordinary place of inquiry and trial | Explained as the general rule for territorial jurisdiction. |
| Section 178, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 | – | Place of inquiry or trial in cases of uncertainty | Explained as an exception to Section 177, but not applicable to the present case. |
| Section 179, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 | – | Offense triable where act is done or consequence ensues | Explained as an exception to Section 177, but not applicable to the present case. |
| Section 180, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 | – | Place of trial where act is an offense by reason of relation to other offense | Explained as an exception to Section 177, but not applicable to the present case. |
| Section 184, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 | – | Place of trial for offenses triable together | Explained as being applicable only if offenses can be tried together under Sections 219, 220, or 221 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. |
| Section 218, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 | – | Separate charges for distinct offenses | Explained as the general rule for separate charges. |
| Section 220, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 | – | Trial for more than one offense | The core provision under consideration; the Court determined that the offenses were not part of the same transaction. |
| Section 461, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 | – | Irregularities which vitiate proceedings | Explained as not being applicable in the present case to invalidate the trial before the Judicial Magistrate. |
| Section 90, Indian Penal Code, 1860 | – | Consent given under fear or misconception | Referred to by the appellant, but not directly addressed by the Court in its reasoning. |
| Section 376, Indian Penal Code, 1860 | – | Rape | The substantive offense for which the accused was discharged. |
| Sections 504 and 506, Indian Penal Code, 1860 | – | Intentional insult and criminal intimidation | The offenses for which the accused was tried and acquitted by the Judicial Magistrate. |
Judgment
| Submission by Parties | Court’s Treatment |
|---|---|
| Appellant: Offenses were part of the same transaction | Rejected. The Court held that the acts of sexual assault in Delhi and the subsequent threats in Uttarakhand were not proximate in time or place, lacked continuity, and did not share a common purpose or design. |
| Appellant: Sessions Judge lacked jurisdiction to discharge the accused under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. | Rejected. The Court held that the Sessions Judge rightly discharged the accused due to lack of territorial jurisdiction. |
| Appellant: Trial for offenses under Sections 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, before the Judicial Magistrate should be quashed. | Rejected. The Court held that the trial was valid and the Magistrate was competent to try the offenses. |
| State: Offenses were part of the same transaction and should be tried together | Rejected. The Court held that the offenses were not part of the same transaction. |
| State: Trial conducted by the Judicial Magistrate was vitiated under Section 461(l) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. | Rejected. The Court held that the Magistrate was empowered to try the offenses under Sections 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. |
| Accused: Offenses were not part of the same transaction | Accepted. The Court agreed that the offenses were distinct and did not form part of the same transaction. |
| Accused: Sessions Judge rightly separated the charges. | Accepted. The Court held that the Sessions Judge rightly discharged the accused under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, due to lack of territorial jurisdiction. |
How each authority was viewed by the Court?
- Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and Anr. [(1999) 8 SCC 728]: The Court distinguished this case, noting it dealt with the issue of jurisdiction at the investigation stage and continuing offenses, which were not applicable in the present case.
- Sunita Kumari Kashyap v. State of Bihar and Anr. [(2011) 11 SCC 301]: This case was also distinguished as it pertained to continuing offenses of cruelty and dowry demand, unlike the distinct offenses in the present case.
- Mohan Baitha and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr. [(2001) 4 SCC 350]: The Court relied on this case for the principles on determining what constitutes the “same transaction,” emphasizing the need for proximity of time, place, continuity of action, and common purpose.
- Anju Chaudhary v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. [(2013) 6 SCC 384]: This case was relied upon for the tests to determine if two or more acts constitute the same transaction, reinforcing the need for commonality of purpose or design and continuity of action.
What weighed in the mind of the Court?
The Supreme Court’s decision was primarily influenced by the following factors:
- Lack of Proximity: The alleged sexual assault in Delhi and the subsequent threats in Uttarakhand were neither proximate in time nor place.
- Lack of Continuity: There was no continuity of action between the sexual assault and the later threats. The sexual assault was a completed act, and the threats were a separate incident.
- Lack of Common Purpose: The acts did not share a common purpose or design. The sexual assault was for the purpose of sexual exploitation, while the threats were for intimidation.
- Distinct Offenses: The offenses under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Sections 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, were distinct in nature and occurred at different places and times.
- Territorial Jurisdiction: The Court emphasized that the offense under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, occurred in Delhi, which was outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Chamoli court.
| Sentiment | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Lack of Proximity | 30% |
| Lack of Continuity | 25% |
| Lack of Common Purpose | 20% |
| Distinct Offenses | 15% |
| Territorial Jurisdiction | 10% |
| Ratio | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Fact | 60% |
| Law | 40% |
Logical Reasoning
The Court considered alternative interpretations but rejected them because the facts did not support the argument that the offenses were part of the same transaction. The Court emphasized that the alleged rape in Delhi was a completed act, and the subsequent threats in Uttarakhand were separate incidents.
The Supreme Court held that the Sessions Judge, Chamoli, was correct in discharging the accused of the offense under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, due to lack of territorial jurisdiction. The Court also upheld the validity of the trial conducted by the Judicial Magistrate for the offenses under Sections 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
The majority opinion was delivered by Justice Dinesh Maheshwari, with Justice Vikram Nath concurring. There were no dissenting opinions.
Key quotes from the judgment:
- “The expression ‘same transaction’ from its very nature is incapable of an exact definition.”
- “Common sense and the ordinary use of language must decide whether on the facts of a particular case, it can be held to be in one transaction.”
- “The acts in question were neither proximate in time nor proximate in place; they were not of continuity either.”
Key Takeaways
- Offenses must be closely connected in terms of time, place, continuity, and purpose to be considered part of the same transaction for a joint trial.
- Territorial jurisdiction is a key factor in determining where an offense should be tried.
- Separate charges must be framed and tried separately for distinct offenses, unless they form part of the same transaction.
- This judgment clarifies the application of Section 220 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and provides guidance on determining what constitutes the “same transaction.”
Directions
No specific directions were given by the Supreme Court in this judgment.
Development of Law
The ratio decidendi of this case is that for multiple offenses to be tried together under Section 220 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, they must form part of the “same transaction,” which requires proximity in time, place, continuity of action, and common purpose. This case reinforces the existing legal principles regarding territorial jurisdiction and the joinder of charges. There is no change in the previous position of law.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court upheld the discharge of the accused in the rape case due to a lack of territorial jurisdiction, clarifying that the alleged sexual assault in Delhi and subsequent threats in Uttarakhand were not part of the same transaction. This judgment provides important guidance on the application of Section 220 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and emphasizes the importance of territorial jurisdiction in criminal trials.